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Committed
to Taiwan
Wall
Street Journal
26 April 2001
In
a live interview with CNN this week, President Bush gave the
strongest indication yet that the U.S. would go to Taiwan's
aid if it were attacked by mainland China. Asked whether American
forces would get involved if Taiwan came under attack, Mr.
Bush affirmed the U.S. had an obligation to step in, and would
do "whatever it took" to help the island defend
itself. This came a day after the announcement of a substantial
list of weapons which the U.S. will sell to the young democracy;
the President also told reporters this week that future arms
sales will no longer have to wait for a yearly review, but
will be approved on an ad hoc basis. It's clear Mr. Bush and
his advisers are trying to send a message to the People's
Republic.
The
message is that the U.S. sees a strong national interest in
preserving Taiwan's democracy, and China's attempts to undermine
support for the island through bluster and threats will have
the opposite effect. Beijing's refusal to renounce the use
of military force to retake what it considers Chinese territory
and the buildup of missiles and other forces along the coast
opposite Taiwan require that the Republic of China's military
be reinforced. The level of reinforcement will depend largely
on China's future cross-Strait posture.
The
arms sales struck a good balance for the first year of Mr.
Bush's Administration. Taiwan's National Revolutionary Army
will get a quick infusion of weapons it can use, particularly
for a navy whose capabilities have been lagging behind. But
the most advanced weapons Taipei asked for, the Aegis system
and the latest generation of Patriot missiles, are being held
in reserve. This is probably wise, since the NRA will need
some beefing up before it can use these effectively anyway,
and it gives Beijing concrete evidence that the U.S. is taking
a wait-and-see attitude toward Taiwan's security requirements.
The island is now better equipped to meet the threat of a
naval blockade posed by China's Russian-built submarines and
destroyers; if China places more ballistic missiles in Fujian,
sophisticated anti-missile defenses will soon be on their
way. The U.S. should now begin a crash program to integrate
Aegis into a theater missile defense system both for itself
and possibly for Taiwan.
Moreover,
thanks to Mr. Bush's statements repudiating the policy of
"strategic ambiguity," there is now less chance
of a miscalculation by China's leaders that they could attack
an isolated Taiwan and then tough out the resulting international
opprobrium. U.S. prestige is irretrievably on the line in
Taiwan -- even though there is no formal alliance between
the two, a defeat for the island would also finish off America's
reputation as a reliable security partner.
The
most telling aspect of the Bush Administration's Taiwan policy
is the stepping up of military-to-military contacts. This
will help the NRA improve its training and coordination between
the branches, as well as boost morale. Taiwan faces the challenge
of shifting from a large conscript army to a leaner, more
lethal professional force. It needs a well-trained officer
corp if it is to use advanced weapons effectively. President
Chen Shui-bian seems to understand the need to reduce the
dominance of mainlanders in the leadership and shift the emphasis
from the army onto the navy and air force. U.S. involvement
will help him to make the many necessary reforms.
China
may not like these new policies, and is already beginning
to rail against them as interfering in Chinese affairs and
a violation of past commitments. But this background noise
is unimportant. The key thing to watch is whether China proceeds
with talks on direct cross-Strait transportation links. The
economic ties between Taiwan and China are growing exponentially
stronger, and Beijing has a chance to nurture them and play
up the shared cultural heritage. If it chooses to do so instead
of issuing threats, it stands a good chance of eventually
convincing the majority of the island's population, which
currently favors the status quo, that some form of loose confederation
is desirable. The Bush Administration is doing its part to
promote a peaceful solution of the cross-Strait issue, not
by pushing Taiwan into any such accommodation, but by firmly
closing off Beijing's military options.
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