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106th
CONGRESS - 1st Session (H.R. 1838)
To assist
in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other
purposes
IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May
18, 1999
Mr. DELAY (for himself, and Mr. Gilman, Mr. Burton, Mr.
Rohrabacher, Mr. Cox, Mr. Cook, Mr. Smith of New Jersey,
Mr. Hunter, Mr. Diaz-Balart, Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania,
Mr. Deutsch, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Wu, Mr. Andrews and Mrs.
Lowey) introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the International Relations Committee
A
BILL
To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan,
and for other purposes.
Be
it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION
1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Security Enhancement
Act".
SEC.
2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United
States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both societies.
(2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a major political
transformation, and Taiwan is today a true multiparty democracy
with a political system separate from and totally unlike
that of the People's Republic of China.
(3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free market principles
and is separate and distinct from the People's Republic
of China.
(4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United States Government
withdrew diplomatic recognition of the government on Taiwan
as the legitimate government of China, neither at that time
nor since has the United States Government adopted a formal
position as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than
to state that status must be decided by peaceful means.
Any determination of the ultimate status of Taiwan must
have the express consent of the people on Taiwan.
(5) The government on Taiwan no longer claims to be the
sole legitimate government of all of China.
(6) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) states that--
(A)
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area are in the
political, security, and economic interests of the United
States and are of international concern;
(B) the decision of the United States to establish diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon
the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined
by peaceful means;
(C) the United States would consider any effort to determine
the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including
boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security
of the Western Pacific region and of grave concern to the
United States;
(D) the United States will maintain the capacity to resist
any form of coercion that jeopardizes the security, or the
social or the economic system, of the people on Taiwan;
and
(E) the preservation and enhancement of the human rights
of all the people on Taiwan are objectives of the United
States.
(7) On
the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan Relations Act establishes
on the part of the United States a continuing connection with
and concern for Taiwan, its people, and their ability to maintain
themselves free of coercion and free of the use of force against
them. The maintenance by Taiwan of forces adequate for defense
and deterrence is in the interest of the United States in
that it helps to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait area.
(8) Since 1954, when the United States and Taiwan signed the
Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and Taiwan have maintained
a defense and security relationship that has contributed greatly
to freedom, peace, and stability in Taiwan and the East Asia
and Pacific regions.
(9) The United States and Taiwan no longer conduct joint training
missions, have no direct military lines of communication,
and have only limited military-to-military contacts. This
lack of communication and interoperation between the United
States and Taiwan hinders planning for the defense of Taiwan
and could prove detrimental in the event of future aggression
against Taiwan.
(10) Since 1979, the United States has continued to sell defensive
weapons to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations
Act, and such sales have helped Taiwan maintain its autonomy
and freedom in the face of persistent hostility from the People's
Republic of China. However, pressures to delay, deny, and
reduce arms sales to Taiwan have been prevalent since the
signing of the August 17, 1982, communique with the People's
Republic of China. Over time, such delays, denials, and reductions
could prevent Taiwan from maintaining a sufficient capability
for self-defense.
(11) As has been affirmed on several occasions by the executive
branch of Government, the provisions of the Taiwan Relations
Act take legal precedence over any communique with the People's
Republic of China.
(12) The People's Republic of China has consistently refused
to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and has repeatedly
threatened force against Taiwan, including implied threats
by unnamed People's Republic of China officials on January
10, 1999, who warned Taiwan not to participate in the development
of theater missile defense capabilities with the United States.
(13) The missile firings by the People's Republic of China
near Taiwan in August 1995 and March 1996 clearly demonstrate
the willingness of the People's Republic of China to use forceful
tactics to limit the freedom of the people on Taiwan.
(14) As most nations in East Asia reduce military spending,
the People's Republic of China continues a major and comprehensive
military buildup.
(15) (A) This military buildup includes the development of
advanced ballistic and cruise missiles that will incorporate
precision guidance capability and the construction of new
imaging, radar, navigation, and electronic intelligence satellites
that will help target and guide ballistic and cruise missiles.
(B) According to the Department of Defense report entitled
"The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait", submitted to
Congress in February 1999, the size of the missile force of
the People's Republic of China is expected to grow substantially
and, by 2005, the People's Republic of China will possess
an "overwhelming advantage" in offensive missiles vis-a-vis
Taiwan. (C) The Department of Defense has also noted that
the People's Republic of China may already possess the capability
to damage satellite optical sensors with lasers, is researching
advanced anti-satellite lasers that could blind United States
intelligence satellites, and is procuring radio frequency
weapons that disable electronic equipment. (D) These missile
and anti-satellite capabilities pose a grave threat to Taiwan.
(16) This military buildup also includes the construction
or procurement from abroad of advanced naval systems, including
Russian Kilo submarines that are difficult to detect, Russian
technology to assist the development of new nuclear-powered
attack submarines, Russian Sovremenny class destroyers armed
with supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, a new
long-range, all-weather naval attack aircraft called the JH-7,
and new indigenous land-attack cruise missiles that could
be launched from submarines, ships, and naval attack aircraft.
These naval capabilities pose a grave threat of blockade to
Taiwan.
(17) This military buildup also includes the improvement of
air combat capabilities by procuring and co-producing hundreds
of Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, seeking to purchase Russian
Su-30 all-weather attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with
advanced air-to-air missiles such as the Russian R-77 missile
and other precision guided munitions, constructing the indigenously
designed J-10 fighter, and seeking advanced airborne warning
and control systems from abroad. These capabilities pose a
grave airborne threat to Taiwan.
(18) Because of the introduction of advanced submarines into
the Taiwan Strait area by the People's Republic of China and
the increasing capability of the People's Republic of China
to blockade Taiwan, Taiwan needs to acquire diesel-powered
submarines in order to maintain a capability to counter a
blockade, to conduct antisubmarine warfare training, and for
other purposes.
(19) Because of the democratic form of government on Taiwan
and the historically nonaggressive foreign policy of Taiwan,
it is highly unlikely that Taiwan would use submarines in
an offensive manner.
(20) The current defense relationship between the United States
and Taiwan is deficient in terms of its capacity over the
long term to counter and deter potential aggression against
Taiwan by the People's Republic of China.
SEC.
3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) TRAINING OF TAIWAN MILITARY OFFICERS. - It is the sense
of Congress that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries
of the military departments should make every effort to
reserve additional positions for Taiwan officers at the
National Defense University and other professional military
education schools specified in section 2162(d) of title
10, United States code, and for prospective Taiwan military
officers at the United States Military Academy, the United
States Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy.
(b) FOREIGN MILITARY SALES. - It is the sense of Congress
that the Secretary of State should, when considering foreign
military sales to Taiwan -
(1)
take into account the special status of Taiwan; and
(2) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan has full and
timely access to price and availability data for defense
articles and defense services.
SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.
(a) INCREASE IN TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
IN TAIWAN.- Upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, the President shall use funds available to the Department
of Defense under the Arms Export Control Act for the assignment
or detail of additional technical staff to the American
Institute in Taiwan.
(b) ANNUAL REPORTS.- Beginning 60 days after the next round
of arms talks between the United States and Taiwan, and
annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report
to Congress--
(1)
detailing each of Taiwan's requests for purchase of defense
articles and defense services during the one-year period
ending on the date of the report;
(2) describing the defense needs asserted by Taiwan as justification
for those requests; and
(3) describing any decision to reject, postpone, or modify
any such request that was made during the one-year period
ending on the date of the report, the level at which the
final decision was made, and a justification for the decision.
SEC.
5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
(a) MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF
TAIWAN- Congress finds that any determination of the nature
or quantity of defense articles or defense services to be
made available to Taiwan that is made on any basis other than
the defense needs of Taiwan, whether pursuant to the August
17, 1982, Communique signed with the People's Republic of
China, or any similar executive agreement, order, or policy
would violate the intent of Congress in the enactment of section
3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)).
(b) PLAN REGARDING COMBINED TRAINING AND PERSONNEL EXCHANGE
PROGRAMS.---
(1)
DEVELOPMENT.- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall develop a plan for the
enhancement of programs and arrangements for operational
training and exchanges of personnel between the Armed Forces
of the United States and the armed forces of Taiwan for
work in threat analysis, doctrine, force planning, operational
methods, and other areas. The plan shall provide for exchanges
of officers up to and including general and flag officers
in the grade of O-10.
(2) REPORT.- Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report
to Congress, in classified or unclassified form, containing
the plan required under paragraph (1).
(3) IMPLEMENTATION.- Not later than 210 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
implement the plan required under paragraph (1).
(c) COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN MILITARY COMMANDS.- Not later
than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall establish secure direct communications
between the United States Pacific military command and the
Taiwan military command.
(d) MISSILE DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.- Subject to subsection (h),
the President is authorized to make available for sale to
Taiwan, at reasonable cost, theater missile defense equipment
and related items, including --
(1)
ground-based and naval-based missile defense systems; and
(2) reconnaissance and communications systems, as may be
necessary to target and cue missile defense systems sold
to Taiwan.
(e) SATELLITE
EARLY WARNING DATA.- Subject to subsection (h), the President
is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable
cost, satellite early warning data.
(f) AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.- Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan,
at reasonable cost, modern air-defense equipment, including
the following:
(1)
AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.
(2) Additional advanced fighters and airborne warning and
control systems (AWACS).
(3) Equipment to better defend airfields from air and missile
attack.
(4) Communications infrastructure that enables coordinated
joint-force air defense of Taiwan.
(g) NAVAL
DEFENSE SYSTEMS.- Subject to subsection (h), the President
is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable
cost, defensive systems that counter the development by the
People's Republic of China of new naval capabilities, including
defense systems such as --
(1)
diesel-powered submarines;
(2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne systems,
capable of detecting new Kilo and advanced Chinese nuclear
submarines;
(3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis destroyers,
capable of defeating foreign supersonic anti-ship missiles;
and
(4) communications systems that better enable Taiwan to
conduct joint-force naval defense operations.
(h) RELATION
TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.- Nothing in this section supersedes
or modifies the application of section 36 of the Arms Export
Control Act to the sale of any defense article or defense
service under this section.
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