Washington Watch

Taiwan should be more pleased with the Republican Party platform than with that of the Democrats. The many changes that were made from the original Republican draft reflect a strong commitment to democratic Taiwan and its future.

"A Republican president will honor our promises to the people of Taiwan, a longstanding friend of the United States, and a genuine democracy. Only months ago the people of Taiwan chose a new president in free and fair elections. Taiwan deserves America's strong support, including the timely sale of defensive arms to enhance Taiwan's security," reads the platform.

This coded reference to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act was not in the original draft and reflects the endorsement of the TSEA that can be found on George W. Bush's Web site. The first draft endorsed a "one China" policy, and the Bush Web site still notes that the Republican candidate supports such a policy. The final version states, however, that "America has acknowledged the view that there is `one China.'"

The platform echoes President Clinton's "assent of the people of Taiwan" phrase: "We deny the right of Beijing to impose its rule on the free Taiwanese people. All issues regarding Taiwan's future must be resolved peacefully and must be agreeable to the people of Taiwan," it reads.

Finally, the platform warns, "If China violates these principles and attacks Taiwan, then the United States will respond appropriately in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. America will help Taiwan defend itself."

The Democratic Party platform is less detailed in its statements about Taiwan. It notes that the US "must continue to engage China while at the same time insisting on adherence to international standards on human rights, freedom, the persecution of religion, the suppression of Tibet, and bellicose threats directed at Taiwan." A Gore Administration, the platform avows, "will fulfill its responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act," and will also "remain committed to a `one China' policy. Like its Republican counterpart it echoes Clinton's "assent of the people," phrase: "We support a resolution of cross-Straits issues that is both peaceful and consistent with the wishes of the people of Taiwan."

Taiwan should be more pleased with the Republican platform, then, but wary. When Henry Kissinger read the platform, he probably just shook his head knowingly. After all, his proteges are prominent in the team of foreign policy advisors surrounding George W. Bush, men like Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleberger, and should be able to keep Bush junior on the right Kissingerian China track.

Besides, as is amply documented in The Kissinger Transcripts, edited by William Burr, Kissinger knows just how important platform statements are. He had to put out some fires with the Chinese over the 1976 Republican platform which virtually embraced a two Chinas policy.

In a mid-August 1976 conversation, Chinese Ambassador Huang Zhen confronted Kissinger on the platform's statements, saying,"I would like to say something about this [Taiwan]. Recently people in the United States have made many official and non-official comments about Sino-US relations."

Kissinger replied, "Which have been official? I don't consider the Republican Party platform official."

Later in the conversation, Huang said, "I hope we can proceed on the basis of the Shanghai communique as Vice Premier Zhang pointed out to Senator Scott."

Kissinger responded, "It is our firm purpose to do so. We will act on this basis, and not on the basis of what is written in this or that platform."

Most political commentators would agree with Kissinger's views on the importance of platform language for either party. A more serious question is whether either Gore or Bush will take a step back from the accepted version of the US "one China" policy. A look at the historical record doesn't leave one very optimistic that there will be any change in what has been a distinct China tilt in US policy through Democratic and Republican Administrations alike since 1972.

In Kissinger's grand geopolitical scheme, Taiwan was expendable. During Kissinger's first trip to Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai pressed forcefully on the Taiwan issue. According to John Holdridge, a Kissinger aide, only after Kissinger said, "What I had written for him on no two Chinas; no one China, one Taiwan; no independent Taiwan," did Chou respond,"Good, these talks may proceed."

When Nixon himself visited, he explicitly agreed with Chou on the Taiwan issue. His notes for his opening presentation to Chou show this clearly.

"Taiwan: I reiterate what our policy is: 1. Status is determined -- one China, Taiwan is part of China -- 2. Won't support Taiwan independence."

The previous US position on Taiwan was that its status was "undetermined," left purposely so by the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. The Shanghai Communique of 1972 was more circumspect than the private Nixon-Chou agreements, stating that the US "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position."

Secretary of State William Rogers, who had been cut out of the China loop by Kissinger, noted that many native Taiwanese did not agree with Chiang Kai-shek's position about Taiwan being part of China. He suggested the language be changed from "all Chinese" to "Chinese." Kissinger tried to get the Chinese to accept the word change, but got nowhere.

Nixon's approach to China has dominated the thinking of all subsequent Administrations on China. Consider the current presidential campaign. Asked in March what he would do if Taiwan were to declare independence, George W. Bush responded, "I would hope Taiwan would also hear the call that the `one China' policy is important for the peaceful resolution of the dispute between China and Taiwan. Taiwan must be reminded by our country that the `one China' policy has allowed Taiwan to develop into a market-oriented economy and to a flourishing democracy. It has worked, and the role of the US is to use our prestige in the world to make sure that the `one China' policy remains intact."

On April 4, Al Gore stated, "We also have concerns over tensions building between China and Taiwan. We need to maintain our commitment to the `one China' policy, but urge China and Taiwan to intensify their dialogue and to resolve their problems by peaceful means. The administration is honoring its obligation to make defensive weapons available to Taiwan."

For Taiwan, the democracy card is the key to unlocking this `one China' box. US policy has been based, as William Rogers so clearly noted, on the flawed premise that all people in Taiwan accept the `one China' framework. It wasn't true in 1972. It is less true today. Platform statements come and go. Neither Nixon's private assurances to China nor the time-framed Communiques are binding policy statements for tomorrow's US government, no matter what Chinese leaders think.

Taiwanese democracy is here to stay and must be factored into a new US policy formula. As Chen Shui-bian asked so clearly on Aug. 18, "If we make it [reunification] the only option, will this still be a democracy?"

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