THE BATTLE over granting permanent normal trade relations status to China, and thus easing its entry into the World Trade Organization, is said to be over. The Senate on Wednesday turned back the last serious challenge; the measure is scheduled for final passage next week.

We have favored normal trade relations for China, albeit with strong misgivings, but we think one remaining question deserves attention before senators complete action. Back in 1992 China extracted a deal from President Bush governing the terms on which Taiwan would be allowed into the GATT, the precursor to the WTO. Taiwan would join only after China had been let in--even though Taiwan's economy and legal structure qualified it for entry long before China. Moreover, Taiwan would not join as a nation but rather as the "separate customs territory of Taiwan"--a formulation that accommodates China's insistence that Taiwan is not a proper country.

Sounds like China got all it could possibly want? Apparently not. This summer Chinese negotiators in Geneva proposed new language governing Taiwan's entry, referring to the island as part of China. Last week the Chinese foreign ministry reiterated this position. And President Jiang Zemin stuck by it in his Sept. 8 meeting with President Clinton. Mr. Jiang then went on to give a speech in which he repeated China's rejection of Taiwanese sovereignty and stressed that he would never bend on this point as part of a compromise to gain accession to the WTO.

The administration says not to worry: China's public statements are wilder than its real intentions. In a meeting after Mr. Jiang's speech last week, senior Chinese officials reassured the Clinton administration that they still accept the 1992 deal, U.S. officials say. China's negotiators in Geneva seem to have lost interest in pushing for revision. If China resumed efforts to change the language, the administration promises it would use its clout to hold up Chinese accession to the WTO.

The administration may be right that Taiwan's entry into the organization is certain, immediately after China's and under acceptable language. But is it not at least conceivable that the public statements of China's paramount leader reflect Chinese intentions more accurately than the private assurances of lower-level officials? Is it realistic to think that China will grow more conciliatory after it has won its Senate vote? And if not, how reassuring are the promises of a U.S. administration that may no longer be in office when the final decisions are made?

The House approved permanent normal trade relations despite China's abysmal human rights record, and on balance it was right to favor increased trade. But it can't be right to admit China at the expense of democratic Taiwan. Yet the administration continues to act, at least publicly, as an enabler to China's bullying. On Aug. 31 Mr. Clinton sent a letter to Sen. Jon Kyl reaffirming his commitment to the 1992 Taiwan language. But when Mr. Jiang then came to New York and dissented from that agreement, the administration offered no public retort. Instead, White House aides portrayed the Jiang-Clinton encounter as "a very good meeting," in which Mr. Clinton had sought to "encourage a cross-strait dialogue."

It is this sort of gloss that drives some in Congress to doubt the administration's resolve in dealing with China and its value as a guarantor of China's honorable intentions. If the Chinese intend to keep their deal on Taiwan's admission to the WTO, why not ask them to say so before the final Senate vote?